Boggs v. Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corporation
Boggs v. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 216 W. Va. 656 (W. Va. 2004) 2004 W.Va Lexis 217
Facts
On September 28, 2001, Hilda Boggs, slipped and broke her ankle. She was referred by her family doctor to Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital in Parkersburg for treatment. Prior to her surgery she was evaluated by a cardiologist and endocrinologist due to some other unrelated health issues. Spinal anesthesia was recommended rather than general anesthesia. Spinal anesthesia was administered prior to surgery by Dr. Manish Koyawala. Shortly after Ms. Boggs stopped breathing and went into cardiac arrest. She died several days later on October 1, 2001. Ms. Boggs widower, Bernard Boggs alleged Dr. Koyawala caused Ms. Boggs death by failing to adhere to the standard of care for anesthetizing her. He filed claims against Dr. Koyawala, United Anesthesia, Inc., and Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital for negligent hiring and retention, as well as vicarious liability. Mr. Boggs also asserted that following Ms. Boggs death, several of the parties engaged in a cover-up, which led Mr. Boggs to also file claims for fraud, destruction of records, outrage, and spoliation of evidence.
Procedural History
Mr. Boggs filed three separate lawsuits, each very similar. The first suit (Boggs I) filed February 28, 2002 was not prosecuted because the summons and complaint were not served within 120 days or filing, leading the court to dismiss the case. A second lawsuit (Boggs II) was filed by Mr. Boggs on June 29, 2003 which was also dismissed by a lower court, and is the issue of this case. The third lawsuit (Boggs III) was filed because of the dismissal of the second case, but a change in law applying to tort actions filed after July 1, 2003 could greatly reduce Mr. Boggs’ damages if he proceeds with that suit.
In Boggs II the lower court dismissed the case by claiming that all the claims, including claims independent of any medical malpractice were barred by the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (“MPLAâ€). When Mr. Boggs’ counsel served “notices of claim†and “certificates of merit†on the defendants in May 2003, the certificates of merit were blank. Corrected certificates were sent out to defendants on June 2, 2003, 27 days prior to Mr. Boggs filing his suit. Following the dismissal, on January 30, 2004, Mr. Boggs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his complaint under Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, which was denied.
Issue
Did the Circuit Court erroneously dismiss all claims, including those independent of any medical malpractice under the MPLA; and by denying Mr. Boggs to amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rules
W.Va. Code, §55-7B-6(b) states, “At least thirty days prior to the filing of a medical professional liability action against a health care provider, the claimant shall serve by certified mail, return receipt requested, a notice of claim on each health care provider the claimant will join in litigation. The notice of claim shall include a statement of the theory or theories of liability upon which a cause of action may be based, and a list of all health care providers and health care facilities to whom notices of claim are being sent, together with a screening certificate of merit. The screening certificate of merit shall be executed under oath by a health care provider qualified as an expert under the West Virginia rules of evidence and shall state with particularity: (1) The expert's familiarity with the applicable standard of care in issue; (2) the expert's qualifications; (3) the expert's opinion as to how the applicable standard of care was breached; and (4) the expert's opinion as to how the breach of the applicable standard of care resulted in injury or death. A separate screening certificate of merit must be provided for each health care provider against whom a claim is asserted. The person signing the screening certificate of merit shall have no financial interest in the underlying claim, but may participate as an expert witness in any judicial proceeding. Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the application of rule 15 of the rules of civil procedure.â€
Rule 15(a) W. Va. R. Civ. P. states, “A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
Holding
The Circuit Court erroneously dismissed all charges under the MPLA and should have allowed Mr. Boggs to amend his complaint.
Reasoning
The Court had previously given meaning to the phrase, “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.†The purpose is “to secure an adjudication on the merits of the controversy as would be secured under identical factual situations in the absence of procedural impediments.â€
The requirements to be met are: “(1) the amendment permits the presentation of the merits of the action; (2) the adverse party is not prejudiced by the sudden assertion of the subject of the amendment; and (3) the adverse party can be given ample opportunity to meet the issue.†(Syl. pt. 3, Rosier v. Garron, Inc., 156 W.Va 861, 199 S.E.2d 50 (1973). Here, the three requirements are met as there is no new issue to be adjudicated, both parties have known about the claim for some time now, and the amendment will allow the merits of the case to be presented, which has yet to be presented to a court. Further, the Circuit Court’s position it had no authority to allow an amendment on a case previously dismissed defies the goal of Rule 15, “to insure that cases and controversies be determined upon their merits and not upon legal technicalities or procedural niceties.†Brooks v. Isinghood, 213 W.Va. 675, 584 S.E.2d. 531. With the reversal, the changes made to the MPLA on July 1, 2003 do not apply to the case.
The Court further clarified that the MPLA only applies to “medical professional liability actions†not contemporaneous or related actions to the alleged act of liability. This is applicable only to health care services actually rendered, or ones that should have been rendered. Thus, fraud, negligent hiring and retention and spoliation of evidence are not claims that are actionable under the MPLA. As such, the Circuit Court was wrong in dismissing these claims along with the actual negligence claims with respect to health care services rendered.
Boggs v. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 216 W. Va. 656 (W. Va. 2004) 2004 W.Va Lexis 217
Facts
On September 28, 2001, Hilda Boggs, slipped and broke her ankle. She was referred by her family doctor to Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital in Parkersburg for treatment. Prior to her surgery she was evaluated by a cardiologist and endocrinologist due to some other unrelated health issues. Spinal anesthesia was recommended rather than general anesthesia. Spinal anesthesia was administered prior to surgery by Dr. Manish Koyawala. Shortly after Ms. Boggs stopped breathing and went into cardiac arrest. She died several days later on October 1, 2001. Ms. Boggs widower, Bernard Boggs alleged Dr. Koyawala caused Ms. Boggs death by failing to adhere to the standard of care for anesthetizing her. He filed claims against Dr. Koyawala, United Anesthesia, Inc., and Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital for negligent hiring and retention, as well as vicarious liability. Mr. Boggs also asserted that following Ms. Boggs death, several of the parties engaged in a cover-up, which led Mr. Boggs to also file claims for fraud, destruction of records, outrage, and spoliation of evidence.
Procedural History
Mr. Boggs filed three separate lawsuits, each very similar. The first suit (Boggs I) filed February 28, 2002 was not prosecuted because the summons and complaint were not served within 120 days or filing, leading the court to dismiss the case. A second lawsuit (Boggs II) was filed by Mr. Boggs on June 29, 2003 which was also dismissed by a lower court, and is the issue of this case. The third lawsuit (Boggs III) was filed because of the dismissal of the second case, but a change in law applying to tort actions filed after July 1, 2003 could greatly reduce Mr. Boggs’ damages if he proceeds with that suit.
In Boggs II the lower court dismissed the case by claiming that all the claims, including claims independent of any medical malpractice were barred by the West Virginia Medical Professional Liability Act (“MPLAâ€). When Mr. Boggs’ counsel served “notices of claim†and “certificates of merit†on the defendants in May 2003, the certificates of merit were blank. Corrected certificates were sent out to defendants on June 2, 2003, 27 days prior to Mr. Boggs filing his suit. Following the dismissal, on January 30, 2004, Mr. Boggs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend his complaint under Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, which was denied.
Issue
Did the Circuit Court erroneously dismiss all claims, including those independent of any medical malpractice under the MPLA; and by denying Mr. Boggs to amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rules
W.Va. Code, §55-7B-6(b) states, “At least thirty days prior to the filing of a medical professional liability action against a health care provider, the claimant shall serve by certified mail, return receipt requested, a notice of claim on each health care provider the claimant will join in litigation. The notice of claim shall include a statement of the theory or theories of liability upon which a cause of action may be based, and a list of all health care providers and health care facilities to whom notices of claim are being sent, together with a screening certificate of merit. The screening certificate of merit shall be executed under oath by a health care provider qualified as an expert under the West Virginia rules of evidence and shall state with particularity: (1) The expert's familiarity with the applicable standard of care in issue; (2) the expert's qualifications; (3) the expert's opinion as to how the applicable standard of care was breached; and (4) the expert's opinion as to how the breach of the applicable standard of care resulted in injury or death. A separate screening certificate of merit must be provided for each health care provider against whom a claim is asserted. The person signing the screening certificate of merit shall have no financial interest in the underlying claim, but may participate as an expert witness in any judicial proceeding. Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit the application of rule 15 of the rules of civil procedure.â€
Rule 15(a) W. Va. R. Civ. P. states, “A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
Holding
The Circuit Court erroneously dismissed all charges under the MPLA and should have allowed Mr. Boggs to amend his complaint.
Reasoning
The Court had previously given meaning to the phrase, “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.†The purpose is “to secure an adjudication on the merits of the controversy as would be secured under identical factual situations in the absence of procedural impediments.â€
The requirements to be met are: “(1) the amendment permits the presentation of the merits of the action; (2) the adverse party is not prejudiced by the sudden assertion of the subject of the amendment; and (3) the adverse party can be given ample opportunity to meet the issue.†(Syl. pt. 3, Rosier v. Garron, Inc., 156 W.Va 861, 199 S.E.2d 50 (1973). Here, the three requirements are met as there is no new issue to be adjudicated, both parties have known about the claim for some time now, and the amendment will allow the merits of the case to be presented, which has yet to be presented to a court. Further, the Circuit Court’s position it had no authority to allow an amendment on a case previously dismissed defies the goal of Rule 15, “to insure that cases and controversies be determined upon their merits and not upon legal technicalities or procedural niceties.†Brooks v. Isinghood, 213 W.Va. 675, 584 S.E.2d. 531. With the reversal, the changes made to the MPLA on July 1, 2003 do not apply to the case.
The Court further clarified that the MPLA only applies to “medical professional liability actions†not contemporaneous or related actions to the alleged act of liability. This is applicable only to health care services actually rendered, or ones that should have been rendered. Thus, fraud, negligent hiring and retention and spoliation of evidence are not claims that are actionable under the MPLA. As such, the Circuit Court was wrong in dismissing these claims along with the actual negligence claims with respect to health care services rendered.