Nonobviousness and the Incentive to Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform

Name
Nonobviousness and the Incentive to Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform
Cite
SSRN
Year
1999
Bluebook cite
Hunt, Robert M., "Nonobviousness and the Incentive to Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform" (April 1999). Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 99-3. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=160674 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.160674
Author
Robert M. Hunt
URL
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=160674
Item Type
article
Summary
Author makes the point that less stringent nonobviousness requirements in patent law can lead to less research and development activity especially in industries which rapidly innovate.

Excerpts and Summaries

Created
Thursday 26 of June, 2008 18:07:58 GMT
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Thursday 26 of June, 2008 18:07:58 GMT
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