- Name
- Commercializing Patents. Stanford Law Review, Forthcoming
- Cite
- UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1395558
- Year
- 2008
- Bluebook cite
- Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009); UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1395558 (2008)
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395558
- Author
- Sichelman, Ted M.
- URL
- http://ssrn.com/abstract=1395558
- Item Type
- article
- Summary
- The author contends (by citing to empirical data)that the current patent system ("reward theory")retards commercialization of patents by rewarding the front end of the process (patenting a new invention) and neglecting the back end (commercializing the invention). The author also examines the cons of the "prospect theory" which proposes granting "strong patents with broad claims and real property-like rights" early in the invention process. The author concludes by offering a solution to encourage commercialization of inventions that splits traditional patents "into an invention patent, granted in exchange for the disclosure of new and non-obvious knowledge, and a commercialization patent, granted in exchange for the manufacture and sale of a substantially new product."
Excerpts and Summaries
- Created
- Thursday 04 of June, 2009 21:22:42 GMT
by Unknown
- LastModif
- Saturday 29 of August, 2009 16:56:04 GMT
by Unknown
The original document is available at
https://casesofinterest.com/tiki/item1125