ACLU v. Miller, 977 F.Supp 1228 (N.D.GA 1997).
In this case, the Court ruled that a criminal statute prohibiting the use of “false identification†online violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and was unconstitutionally vague.
In this action, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled on the plaintiff’s motion to enjoin enforcement of Georgia statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93.1 (hereafter “Statuteâ€), and the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs, the American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia, sued for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the Statute violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and was unconstitutionally vague.
The Statute made it a criminal offense for
any person ... knowingly to transmit any data through a computer network ... for the purpose of setting up, maintaining, operating, or exchanging data with an electronic mailbox, home page, or any other electronic information storage bank or point of access to electronic information if such data uses any individual name ... to falsely identify the person ...
and for
any person ... knowingly to transmit any data through a computer network ... if such data uses any ... trade name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol ... which would falsely state or imply that such person ... has permission or is legally authorized to use it for such purpose when such permission or authorization has not been obtained.
The plaintiffs alleged that the first portion of the Statute would essentially make it illegal to use online pseudonyms, ultimately impeding an online user’s ability to engage in anonymous online discussion. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the second portion of the Statute prohibited legal use of trade names and trademarks for linking from website to website. The defendants argued that the Statute only prohibited fraudulent or improper use of false identification and asked the court to abstain from adjudicating the case so that the Georgia Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret the Statute.
Here, the Court quickly dismissed defendant’s affirmative defenses of standing and abstention, and turned to the merits of the case, ruling that the “plaintiffs are likely to prove that the statute imposes content-based restrictions which are not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's purported compelling interest.â€
The Court pointed out that the author of a document is content like any other content in a document, so the statute at hand, prohibiting false identification of the author, creates a content-based restriction rendering the Statute presumptively invalid under the First Amendment. However, the Court noted this presumption could be overcome if the defendant can show that “the statute furthers a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve it.â€
The defendants cited fraud prevention as the compelling state interest, and the Court agreed that Georgia’s interest in preventing fraud was compelling, however the Court rejected the notion that the Statute was narrowly tailored. The Court ruled that the Statute, while furthering the State’s interest, also prohibited legal speech and use of trade names and marks. The Court noted that the Statute contained no mention of fraud, and, therefore, fraud prevention could not be read into the Statute. Additionally, the Court held that there was no conceivable limiting construction of the Statute, and that, on its face, the statute swept up legal speech along with illegal speech and was unconstitutionally overbroad.
The Court also found that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it was drafted such that an ordinary person could not understand what conduct was legal and what conduct was illegal under the statute. Because the Statute affected speech the Court examined it with heightened sensitivity and permanently enjoined enforcement of the Statute.
In this case, the Court ruled that a criminal statute prohibiting the use of “false identification†online violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and was unconstitutionally vague.
In this action, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled on the plaintiff’s motion to enjoin enforcement of Georgia statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93.1 (hereafter “Statuteâ€), and the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs, the American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia, sued for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the Statute violated the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and was unconstitutionally vague.
The Statute made it a criminal offense for
any person ... knowingly to transmit any data through a computer network ... for the purpose of setting up, maintaining, operating, or exchanging data with an electronic mailbox, home page, or any other electronic information storage bank or point of access to electronic information if such data uses any individual name ... to falsely identify the person ...
and for
any person ... knowingly to transmit any data through a computer network ... if such data uses any ... trade name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted symbol ... which would falsely state or imply that such person ... has permission or is legally authorized to use it for such purpose when such permission or authorization has not been obtained.
The plaintiffs alleged that the first portion of the Statute would essentially make it illegal to use online pseudonyms, ultimately impeding an online user’s ability to engage in anonymous online discussion. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the second portion of the Statute prohibited legal use of trade names and trademarks for linking from website to website. The defendants argued that the Statute only prohibited fraudulent or improper use of false identification and asked the court to abstain from adjudicating the case so that the Georgia Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret the Statute.
Here, the Court quickly dismissed defendant’s affirmative defenses of standing and abstention, and turned to the merits of the case, ruling that the “plaintiffs are likely to prove that the statute imposes content-based restrictions which are not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's purported compelling interest.â€
The Court pointed out that the author of a document is content like any other content in a document, so the statute at hand, prohibiting false identification of the author, creates a content-based restriction rendering the Statute presumptively invalid under the First Amendment. However, the Court noted this presumption could be overcome if the defendant can show that “the statute furthers a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve it.â€
The defendants cited fraud prevention as the compelling state interest, and the Court agreed that Georgia’s interest in preventing fraud was compelling, however the Court rejected the notion that the Statute was narrowly tailored. The Court ruled that the Statute, while furthering the State’s interest, also prohibited legal speech and use of trade names and marks. The Court noted that the Statute contained no mention of fraud, and, therefore, fraud prevention could not be read into the Statute. Additionally, the Court held that there was no conceivable limiting construction of the Statute, and that, on its face, the statute swept up legal speech along with illegal speech and was unconstitutionally overbroad.
The Court also found that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it was drafted such that an ordinary person could not understand what conduct was legal and what conduct was illegal under the statute. Because the Statute affected speech the Court examined it with heightened sensitivity and permanently enjoined enforcement of the Statute.